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Abstract: We study how industry-level agglomeration economies affect government policy. 
Using administrative data on firm subsidies in economically lagging regions of Great Britain, 
we contrast two alternative hypotheses. Economic geography models imply that firms at an 
industry’s core can sustain higher tax burdens or require lower subsidies than firms in more 
remote locations. Conversely, political economy models predict firms at the industry’s core to 
be more successful at lobbying government, particularly at the sub-national level, thus 
obtaining more favourable fiscal treatment. Our evidence suggests that local government 
agencies structure subsidy offers to favour pre-existing employment in locally agglomerated 
industries, behaviour more in line with theories of policy capture than with economic 
geography models. Grants administered by central government agencies, however, conform 
more strongly with the predictions of economic geography models. 
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1. Introduction 
Probably the most important policy-relevant insight generated by the recent 
theoretical literature in economic geography is that, in a world of low trade costs and mobile 
capital, agglomeration economies can tie firms to certain locations and thereby generate 
taxable rents. If agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong and governments are aware of 
them, the race to the bottom in capital taxation, a typical feature of neoclassical tax 
competition models, may not happen.1 Building on a number of prior theoretical 
contributions, this point was made prominently by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), who found 
that the government of a jurisdiction that hosts a cluster of mobile industry will act like a 
limit-pricing monopolist, extracting a fiscal rent from its de facto immobile tax base up to the 
point where it can just hold on to the agglomeration in the face of a low-tax competitor.2 This 
argument has had a considerable impact on policy thinking.3 
Agglomerations of firms, however, could conceivably have the exact opposite effect 
on local taxation, if, rather than having some of their agglomeration rents taxed away, they 
instead were able to exploit their bargaining position to exert political influence on local 
government and obtain favourable treatment. The political-economy literature points to such 
policy capture as being stronger at the local than at the national level (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan, 2002; Redoano, 2010). It also suggests that incumbent declining 
firms and industries expend greater lobbying effort than entrants (Brainard and Verdier, 
1997; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007), and that geographically concentrated industries are 
particularly active in seeking to influence policy (Busch and Reinhardt, 2000). 
In this paper we examine how government policy reacts to agglomeration economies 
by contrasting these alternative theories. We analyse the generosity of a place-based subsidy 
scheme, which aims to induce firms to locate jobs in economically lagging, and sometimes 
remote regions away from existing agglomerations. Subsidies can be thought of as negative 
                                                 
1 Think of the “race to the bottom” as the combination of strategic complementarity among tax rates of 
competing jurisdictions and increasing capital mobility. Agglomeration forces then can act as a de facto 
constraint on capital mobility. 
2 Other important theoretical treatments of this idea include Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Midelfart-
Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Anderson and Forslid (2003), Borck and Pflüger (2006) and Konrad and 
Kovenock (2009). For an overview, see Baldwin et al. (2003, chapters 15 and 16). 
3 In a discussion of the Baldwin-Krugman paper, The Economist (29 March 2001) summarised the key point as 
follows: “(i)f policymakers accept the benefits of agglomeration, one big argument for tax harmonisation falls 
apart”. 
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taxes, and applicants can be categorised by the agglomeration intensity of the industry they 
belong to.4  
Our empirical investigation uses administrative data on a major place-based policy in 
Great Britain, from which we can exploit detailed information on both applications for grants 
by firms and subsequent grant offers by policy authorities. Political economy models suggest 
that capture may be more prevalent at lower tiers of government. Hence we pay particular 
attention to applications made to sub-national policy authorities. For a sample of applications 
to the English regional policy authorities we find evidence that authorities appear to be 
structuring their offers so as to favour, and potentially try and preserve, existing employment 
in more agglomerated industries in areas with a higher concentration of industry employment, 
and where employment in that industry-region is in relative decline. While more than one 
theoretical mechanism could in principle be at play, and hence our results capture a 
combination of these, such behaviour is more consistent with models of local policy capture 
by incumbent firms, than with either government appropriation of agglomeration rents or 
government promotion of high-growth clusters. In contrast, applications to, and offers made 
by, the national policy authorities in England, Scotland and Wales appear to be more in line 
with the predictions emanating from economic geography models. 
Our analysis addresses two identification problems which complicate the empirical 
examination of the hypothesis that governments tax agglomeration rents. The first is two-way 
causation. In economic geography models, tax rates depend on the location of the tax base, as 
in our hypothesis, but the location of the tax base also depends on tax rates. A regression of 
location-specific tax rates on location-specific measures of agglomeration will likely suffer 
from simultaneity bias, unless valid instruments are found for agglomeration. We partly 
circumvent this issue by taking a fiscal variable that is specific to firms, and by regressing 
that variable on an industry-specific agglomeration measure. In this setting, reverse causation 
(whereby the subsidy paid to an individual firm would impact on the pre-existing degree of 
agglomeration of that firm’s industry) is not a plausible concern. 
The second problem arises from the potential for omitted variables: taxes (and 
subsidies) depend on tax bases but also on other factors such as revenue needs and voter 
preferences. A regression of location-specific tax rates on location-specific measures of 
agglomeration can never be entirely free of the suspicion that some relevant right-hand side 
                                                 
4 For a model of agglomeration and taxation that allows taxes to be positive or negative, see Haufler and 
Wooton (2010). 
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variable is missing. This is of particular concern since, in the data, “agglomerated” locations 
usually correspond to urban areas, and urban areas tend to have higher revenue needs for a 
host of reasons. Hence, any estimate suggesting that larger or denser regions levy higher 
taxes will inevitably be tainted by the omitted-variable suspicion. Our approach to this issue 
is to estimate the hypothesis at least in part not across locations but across industries.5 
The hypothesis that governments tax agglomeration rents has been explored 
empirically before.6 All of the existing studies use a cross-location regression design, and all 
of them conclude that observed tax rates are higher in places that are host to an 
agglomeration. Buettner (2001) finds that more populous German municipalities set higher 
local business tax rates, and Charlot and Paty (2006) find that French municipalities with 
greater market potential do likewise.7 More recently, the reverse-causation problem has been 
addressed by instrumenting the right-hand-side agglomeration measure with agglomeration 
measured at a date prior to the introduction of the tax that represents the left-hand-side 
variable (Jofre-Monseny, 2013; Koh, Riedel and Böhm, 2013; and Luthi and Schmidheiny, 
2014). 
Our study builds on two precursor papers. Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2012) 
use the cross-industry dimension to test the hypothesis that firm births in more agglomerated 
industries are less sensitive to regional tax differences than firm births in less agglomerated 
industries. Their analysis uses Swiss data, where tax rates are sector invariant, and finds that 
agglomeration has a statistically significant but quantitatively rather modest attenuating effect 
on the tax sensitivity of firms’ location choices. In the present paper, we take advantage of a 
policy setting where the subsidy can be varied across industries, to test whether the rate 
offered takes account of firms’ differential spatial mobility according to the extent of industry 
localisation. We also build on Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007), who examined 
whether plant location choices in Great Britain are actually influenced by the availability of 
regional subsidies. They find that, other things equal, entrant location decisions are more 
responsive to financial incentives in areas with pre-existing industry activity compared to 
                                                 
5 Concerns about omitted variables in the cross-industry dimension may of course still apply. We discuss this 
below. 
6 See Brülhart, Bucovetsky and Schmidheiny (2015, Section 17.5) for a survey. 
7 The same basic regression design is applied to international data by Garretsen and Peeters (2007), who report 
that effective average tax rates on corporate income across OECD countries correlate positively with country 
size and market potential. In a similar vein, Carlsen, Langset and Rattsø (2005) find that, other things equal, 
Norwegian municipalities set higher infrastructure fees if their local economies are dominated by firms in 
immobile sectors. 
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more peripheral locations.8 Our research question in this paper differs in that we focus on 
how the subsidy applied for by firms and the amount then offered by the government vary 
with the degree of industry agglomeration.9 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the policy setting and data. 
Section 3 sets out the theoretical background and empirical strategy. In Section 4 presents the 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Policy background and data 
2.1 British regional grant schemes 
The policies we exploit are the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and Enterprise 
Grant schemes in Great Britain (see NAO, 2003; Wren, 2005; Devereux et al., 2007 and 
Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen, 2012) over the period 1985-2004.10 These are 
discretionary schemes which offer grants to firms with the stated aim of creating or 
safeguarding employment in specific economically disadvantaged areas. A further official 
aim of the RSA scheme is to attract internationally mobile investment.  
The government agency which administered each scheme, and hence determined the 
level of grant offered, depended on the value and location of the grant application. For 
England, only large applications (above GBP 1 million up to 1996, and above GBP 2 million 
thereafter) were administered by central government in London, while all smaller projects 
were handled by the authorities of the nine English administrative regions. Decisions are 
typically made by formally independent boards comprised of appointed representatives from 
the private and public sectors and working closely with government officials. All projects 
located in Scotland and in Wales were handled by their respective government offices. 
Budgets for the various schemes were allocated centrally in London, with the scheme budgets 
being “based around historical demand [for the scheme] and affordability conditions” 
(National Audit Office, 2003, p. 17). 
                                                 
8 Briant, Lafourcade and Schmutz (2015), studying the effects of “enterprise zones” in France similarly find that 
place-based policies are less effective in terms of employment creation when deployed at relatively remote 
locations. A comparable result is also found by Henderson (1994). Studying locational choices and subsidies to 
new firms in Brazil, he finds that, for a given amount of subsidy, more additional activity can be generated in 
cities where other firms of the same industry are already present than in cities without an established industry. 
9 In addition, we use more comprehensive administrative data on both grant applications and offers to a much 
wider set of entrant and incumbent plants, made under the same programme. 
10 After 2004 both schemes were replaced by a new programme in England, hence our sample ends in that year. 
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Grants could only be paid to projects located in specific “Assisted Areas”, 
characterised by relatively low income per capita, low labour-market participation and/or 
high unemployment rates. Assisted Areas were further classified into three “Tiers” depending 
on their perceived economic needs. Tier 1 (Development Areas) were the most deprived and 
qualified for the highest subsidy rates, Tier 2 (Intermediate Areas) qualified for lower rates, 
and in Tier 3 areas firms could only apply for Enterprise Grants. Assisted-Area status was 
assigned in roughly five-year intervals (1984-88, 1988-93, 1994-99, 2000-06), according to 
EU rules on area characteristics. Assisted Areas are typically, although not always, in 
peripheral locations remote from industrial centres, as they mainly cover coastal areas of 
Scotland and Wales and the South West of England.11 
Eligible applicants included both pre-existing plants in Assisted Areas, which could 
apply for grants to either expand employment or safeguard existing jobs, and new plants that 
considered locating in those areas. Around 90 percent of applicants were in the 
manufacturing sector (DTI, 2003). RSA grants were available for up to a set fraction of 
eligible project costs, which included investment in plant and machinery, land and buildings. 
The programme was targeted at marginal projects, in the sense that a grant needed to be 
necessary for the project to go ahead on the scale proposed, and the government agency 
aimed to award the minimum grant necessary for the project to proceed – often below the 
maximum grant rate permitted under EU legislation. Applicants could submit proposals in 
only one location within Great Britain.   
2.2 Data 
We use information on all applications filed and offers made in Great Britain under 
these schemes from 1985 to 2004, although the data on the Enterprise Grant scheme only 
                                                 
11 A map showing Assisted Areas for 2007-2013, is available here: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081109123403/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38644.png. Our 
industry peripherality measure (described in Section 2.2) averaged across the population of plants in England, 
Wales and Scotland, takes a mean value of 96.172 in Assisted Areas, and 95.772 in non-Assisted Areas, 
indicating that on average plants in Assisted Areas are located at a greater distance from employment in their 
own industry. Assisted Areas are also eligible for EU Structural Fund infrastructure expenditure, which will in 
principle benefit all firms within an area. Expenditure will vary with Tier 1 versus Tier 2 status, which we 
control for in analysis. Assisted Areas can also overlap with Enterprise Zones, which provide business 
assistance and subsidies. However, these are very small brownfield sites of less than 0.5 square km and hence 
will not affect the vast majority of plants in our analysis. Other smaller schemes in operation during the early 
years of our sample period included Regional Innovation Grants/SMART (R&D assistance schemes) and 
Regional Investment Grants available in specific coal closure areas. Both were only open to small firms, and 
expenditure was very low compared to RSA. Our data include an indicator variable of whether or not an 
applicant is in receipt of another form of public assistance. When we include this in our main regressions it is 
never significant and does not affect our main results. 
7  
 
 
cover England and Scotland. Nearly 90 percent of applicants in our data received an offer. 
The information includes the amount of grant applied for, together with the number of jobs to 
be created and/or safeguarded as stated in the application. The data also include information 
on the value of the of grant offered, the associated number of jobs to be safeguarded and/or 
created as estimated by the government, as well as the capital costs associated with the offer. 
In order to account for further parameters of the policy-making process, and variation in these 
over time, we also use data on the Tier to which Assisted Areas are classified and on the 
maximum grant rate allowable in specific locations (postcodes) as mandated by the EU.12 
The data also allow us to distinguish between applications made to the different policy 
authorities using information on the location and value of the application. For our main 
estimation sample we use the set of applications to English regional policy authorities, but as 
a complement we also consider those administered by the respective national policy 
authorities (Scotland and Wales and the English central government body). 
Our second information source is the plant and establishment-level data from the 
British Annual Respondents Database (ARD), where an establishment can comprise one or 
more plants under common ownership in the same line of business.13 We use data for the 
manufacturing sector from 1984 to 2006.14 We link the data on government grants to the 
ARD at the plant or establishment level. Appendix A1 provides more detailed information on 
the matching, and on how we deal with matches to multi-plant establishments.  
We use the plant-level population data to construct measures of the characteristics of 
the applicant plant and its parent firm. These include three indicator variables: an indicator of 
whether the plant is owned by a foreign multinational, an indicator of whether it is part of a 
multi-plant firm, and an indicator of whether the plant is a greenfield entrant. We also 
construct a measure of total manufacturing employment within the remainder of the firm, i.e. 
excluding the plant with which the application is associated. This therefore takes the value 
zero for all single-plant firms, (i.e. plants that are not part of a larger group with 
                                                 
12 Assisted Area eligibility and Tier designation are defined using different spatial units in different periods. 
Prior to 2000 “Travel to Work Areas” were used (see footnote 18). From 2000 onwards, smaller, administrative 
electoral wards were used. The EU sets a maximum admissible grant rate in terms of the ‘Net Grant Equivalent’, 
which is a percentage of the investment after corporate tax. The maximum grant rate can vary within a Tier. For 
example, within Tier 2 areas it varied according to area GDP, unemployment and population density, and 
according to whether or not the area adjoined a Tier 1 area. Hence we use data on maximum grant rates at a 
finer spatial level than the level of the Tier or Travel to Work Area. These data were obtained alongside the 
individual grant application and offer data from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills.  
13 See Barnes and Martin (2002) and Griffith (1999) for a full description. Firms are legally required to respond 
to the survey.  
14 1984 is the first year for which postcode level location information is available. 
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manufacturing activity in Great Britain). These variables are all dated year t. We also 
construct a measure of plant-level employment growth over the previous period (t-1 to t).15 
The plant-level data also contain information on the plant’s five-digit industry, and on its 
precise location (full postcode), which allows us to locate it within a Travel to Work Area. 
When we assign a location to a grant application we assign the postcode at which the actual 
project will take place using the information in the ARD, (and not the postcode supplied in 
the administrative grant applications data, which can sometimes be the postcode for the 
applicant firm’s headquarters). 
 To measure the degree to which each industry is localised, we use the Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997) index of agglomeration. We calculate this at the five-digit industry level for 
each year.16 In our empirical analysis, for ease of interpretation, we convert this to a 
standardised measure, with mean zero and standard deviation of 1 for each estimation 
sample. We construct further five-digit industry-level measures which reflect the policy 
process and which more generally might be correlated with the size of grants applied for and 
offered. Based on the establishment-level sample, we construct measures of the investment 
intensity of the industry (defined as investment in physical capital – plant and machinery, 
buildings and land and vehicles – per worker), and of the skill intensity of the industry 
(defined as the skilled-to-unskilled worker wage bill ratio). We use the plant-level sample to 
measure average employment growth and average plant age, across plants within each 
industry-year.17 
Finally, we construct location-specific variables based on 303 Travel to Work Areas 
(TTWA).18 We measure the straight-line distance between the centres of each possible pair of 
TTWAs and construct indicators of whether TTWAs are within a given radius of each other. 
As a measure of the industry-specific remoteness of a TTWA, we calculate the percentage of 
total industry employment that lies in TTWAs outside a 25 kilometre radius from the TTWA 
                                                 
15 This is defined as (employmentit – employmentit-1) / employmentit-1 and is set equal to zero for new entrants. 
16 The Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index for an industry is given by: 
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and xr are the share of industry employment and total manufacturing employment in region r, respectively, and 
H is the industry Herfindahl index.  
17 Plant age is truncated as the earliest year in which we can observe plants in is 1973. 
18 These are area definitions based on commuting patterns designed to capture local labour markets. The UK 
Office for National Statistics provides a formal definition. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/geography/beginner-s-guide/other/travel-to-work-areas/index.html 
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centre, referring to this measure as “industry peripherality”.19 We again convert this to a 
standardised measure with mean zero and standard deviation of 1 for use in the regression 
analysis. We additionally control for the mean industry wage by TTWA and year, and the 
unemployment rate (claimant count) by year and broad administrative region (nine regions 
within England, plus Wales and Scotland).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: applications to English regional authorities 
Variable   Mean Standard 
deviation 
10th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Application characteristics     
Application amounti  (£1000s) 142.997 264.027 13.998 312.635 
Dummy job creation only applicationi 0.630 0.483 0 1 
Dummy jobs safeguarded only applicationi 0.051 0.220 0 0 
Estimated new jobs at applicationi 17.724 30.154 2 40 
Estimated safeguarded jobs at applicationi 12.570 40.755 0 30 
Offer characteristics     
Offer amounti  (£1000s) 112.242 214.232 12.084 257.274 
Capital costsi  (£1000s) 815.051 1,949.754 64.185 1,816.242 
Dummy job creation only offeri 0.743 0.437 0 1 
Dummy jobs safeguarded only offeri 0.056 0.229 0 0 
New jobs associated with offeri 16.060 27.244 2 36 
Safeguarded jobs associated with offeri 10.092 36.688 0 24 
Firm characteristics     
Dummy multi-plant firmi 0.298 0.457 0 1 
Total employment in firmi 434.439 3,113.596 0 266 
Foreign-owned MNEi 0.045 0.208 0 0 
Entranti 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Employment growthit-1 0.402 2.861 -0.058 0.951 
Industry characteristics     
EG indexst-1 [raw] 0.019 0.040 0.001 0.044 
EG indexst-1 [standardised] 0.000 1.000 -0.430 0.627 
Real investment per workerst-1 (£1000s) 3.735 3.062 1.437 6.546 
Skilled/unskilled worker wage bill ratiost-1 0.849 0.090 0.802 0.917 
Mean plant agest-1 6.704 2.337 3.768 9.837 
Mean employment growthst-1 -0.004 0.370 -0.238 0.161 
Area and area-industry characteristics     
Dummy Tier 1 Assisted Areart 0.433 0.496 0 1 
Maximum grant ratert 0.227 0.075 0.150 0.300 
Real industry wagesrt-1 (£1000s) 19.393 4.475 14.836 24.011 
Claimant count ratert-1 (%age) 5.851 1.950 3.000 7.900 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 [raw] 93.235 10.161 82.162 99.684 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 [standardised] 0.000 1.000 -1.090 0.635 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 [raw] * EG indexst-1 [raw] 1.541 2.690 0.128 3.855 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 [stsd] * EG indexst-1 [stsd] -0.491 4.682 -0.262 0.203 
Note: all statistics calculated across 4,264 applications to English regional policy authorities.  
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
 
                                                 
19 In Table A3 we report robustness to alternative measures. 
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Descriptive statistics on all our variables, for our main estimation sample of 
applications to English regional policy authorities, are provided in Table 1. The table shows 
that the average amount applied for (measured in 2005 GBP) was around £143,000, with the 
average offer made by government at around £112,000. Part of the reason for this difference 
is that the number of jobs to be created or safeguarded that are stipulated in the government 
offer is typically lower than that which the firm had specified at the application stage. The 
majority of offers (74 percent) are made to firms that are only creating new jobs, rather than 
only protecting existing ones, although some grants involve both. Thirty percent of applicants 
are part of multi-site firms and around 5 percent are owned by foreign multinationals. There 
is also considerable variation in the degree of industry localisation as measured by the EG 
index, and our measure of industry peripherality implies that on average fully 93% of 
industry employment lies outside TTWAs within a 25km radius from the centre of the TTWA 
in which an applicant is located. 
3. Theoretical background and empirical strategy 
In this section we contrast alternative theoretical models of government behaviour in 
terms of subsidy offers across more or less agglomerated industries and regions, and across 
different tiers of government. We derive our empirical predictions from these models. 
3.1 Economic geography 
Economic geography models suggest that a purely benevolent government, either national 
or regional, will pay more per job to attract a given firm to a peripheral region if the firm 
belongs to an industry with relatively strong returns to spatial agglomeration. This can be 
represented by the following simple model. Suppose that a government’s policy objective is 
to maximise the number of jobs generated within its jurisdiction, i.e. either at a national level 
or within a region. Moreover, suppose that the government seeks a certain diversity of jobs 
across firms.20 This can most simply be represented by an objective function such as the 
standard constant-elasticity specification: 
                                                 
20 This taste for diversity could result from a desire to mitigate exposure to firm-specific shocks or from a 
perception that diversity of firms has other economic or non-economic benefits. Note that if we assumed that the 
government is perfectly indifferent about the firm in which jobs are created, and abstracting from firm-level 
capacity limits, the government would concentrate all its subsidies on the firm with the lowest perceived cost 
per job. Note also that a taste for diversity across firms implies a taste for diversity across industries. 
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where i denotes firms, ei is the number of jobs created in the jurisdiction, δi is a parameter 
expressing particular preferences for or against certain firms, σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between jobs in different firms (and thus an inverse measure of the government’s taste for 
industrial diversity), and G summarises government services other than its regional job-
creation policy. 
Assuming a balanced budget, the government will face the following constraint: 
 i i
i
T e c G  ,         (2) 
where T is government revenue, ci is the cost to the government of attracting a firm-i job, and 
where the cost to the government of supplying G is normalised to unity. We think of ci as the 
government’s best guess of the minimum per-job subsidy required for firm i to locate in the 
government’s preferred jurisdiction. 
Maximisation of (1) subject to (2) yields the following subsidy per firm, Si : 
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.         (3) 
The derivative of Si with respect to ci is negative. Hence, for a higher required per-job 
subsidy ci, the government pays more per job but less per firm. 
We can write ci as  , , ,i i s r rsc g W X Y Z , where s denotes industries, r denotes local 
labour market areas within the periphery, Wi is a vector of firm-specific attributes, Xs is a 
vector of industry-specific attributes, Yr is a vector of area-specific attributes, and Zrs is a 
vector of industry-area-specific attributes. Assuming linearity and considering a panel with t 
indexing years, our basic empirical specification for ci = cisrt can be written as: 
𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 + 𝑿𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟐 + 𝒀𝒓𝒕𝜷𝟑 + 𝒁𝒓𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟒 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐽𝑗 + 𝑃𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡,    (4) 
where Tt is a set of time dummies to reflect general variation in the generosity of the policy 
over time, Jj are a set of broader 2-digit industry dummies, and Pp is a set of dummy variables 
representing the jurisdictional policy authority that is making the offer. 
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Our main focus is on one element of Xst: the agglomeration intensity of individual 
industries, which we denote with Ast. The central hypothesis emerging from economic 
geography models is that the higher the agglomeration intensity of an industry, the lower is 
the sensitivity of firms in that industry to locational determinants other than the distribution 
of existing same-industry firms.21 Subsidies are one such “other” locational determinant. 
Hence, provided that the locus of the industry’s agglomeration is in the central region, the 
required per-job subsidy at a peripheral location will be higher for firms in more 
agglomerated industries: 0i
s
c
A



. Conversely, according to (3), the subsidy paid per firm will 
be lower for firms in more agglomerated industries: 0i
s
S
A



.22 
Prediction 1 (economic geography): Firms in more agglomerated industries attract 
higher subsidies per job but lower subsidies per firm. 
In our empirical analysis the relationship between subsidy rates and the degree of 
industry agglomeration is identified from cross-industry variation. It is therefore important 
that we control for other industry-level factors that may be correlated with the size of grant 
applications and offers. As discussed in Section 2, we aim to control for a range of 
characteristics at the plant, firm, industry and area level that capture different potential 
correlates of the policy. 
One source of within-industry heterogeneity is the proposed or pre-existing location 
of the plant relative to the geographical core of the industry. Empirically, the locus of 
agglomeration will be different across industries, and may, for some of them, even lie within 
the set of peripheral regions that are eligible for subsidies. Our second focus is on an element 
of Zrst, an interaction term between Ast and Drst, where the latter is a measure of geographic 
distance to existing activity in the industry. We expect the coefficient on the interaction term 
to be positive, 
𝜕2𝑐𝑖
𝜕𝐴𝑠𝜕𝐷𝑟𝑠
⁄ > 0 implying that as industry agglomeration increases, 
                                                 
21 For a formal derivation of this result, see Brülhart et al. (2012). 
22 The latter effect is not generic to all geography models. Burbidge and Cuff (2005) and Fernandez (2005) have 
studied tax competition in models featuring increasing returns to scale that are external to firms, with firms 
operating under perfect competition. In these models, individual firm mobility is not constrained by 
agglomeration economies and governments may compete even more vigorously to attract firms than in the 
standard tax competition model. Krogstrup (2008) shows that for tax competition to be intensified, external 
agglomeration economies must be relatively weak, in the sense that they are outweighed by dispersion forces 
that stabilise the overall spatial allocation of activity. Our working hypothesis is that agglomeration economies 
are sufficiently internalised by firms to affect firms’ locational sensitivity to tax differentials. 
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applicants located further away from existing employment in the industry – and hence less 
likely to benefit from industry agglomeration economies – receive higher offers per job. Put 
differently, the more agglomerated an industry, the more expensive it should be to create or 
retain jobs in a region far away from the locus of the industry. 
Prediction 2 (economic geography): Firms located close to their industry’s 
geographical core attract lower subsidies per job. This effect is stronger the more 
agglomerated the industry. 
Predictions 1 and 2 capture the economic geography result that governments tax 
agglomeration rents, applied to a setting with subsidies.  
3.2 Policy capture 
The alternative model of government behaviour we consider is policy capture by rent-
seeking firms. There is evidence to suggest that lobbying and political mobilisation increase 
when the degree of industry agglomeration is higher (Busch and Reinhart, 2000). Indeed it is 
quite plausible that in areas that exhibit stronger industrial specialisation the local bargaining 
power of firms belonging to predominant sectors might be greater, as larger groups are more 
likely to organise into a lobby (Redoano, 2010). Taken together, these arguments imply that 
firms in more agglomerated industries might in fact have greater scope to extract rents from 
policy makers in the region(s) where the industry is localised.23 In this case, we would expect 
the coefficient on the interaction term discussed above to take the opposite sign, 
𝜕2𝑐𝑖
𝜕𝐴𝑠𝜕𝐷𝑟𝑠
⁄ <  0. That is, as the degree of industry agglomeration rises, per-job subsidies 
would be expected to be increasing in geographic proximity to industry employment – the 
reverse of Prediction 2.  
Prediction 3 (policy capture): Firms located close to their industry’s geographical 
core attract higher subsidies per job. This effect is stronger the more agglomerated the 
industry. 
By pitting Prediction 3 against Prediction 2 we have a direct test of which mechanism 
dominates. Note that domination does not imply uniqueness: even if the data clearly support 
one of the two predictions, this does not mean that the mechanism underlying the other is 
                                                 
23 A similar logic, though in a different setting, is modelled by Brueckner and Neumark (2014). They analyse a 
setting where local public-sector workers are able to extract higher rents in locations with more attractive 
amenities, as the presence of those amenities makes it more costly for taxpayers to “vote with their feet”. 
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necessarily absent. Put differently, our test is about the relative strength of the two opposing 
forces and not only about their existence. In reality, both mechanisms are plausibly at play. 
Our straightforward discriminating criterion has methodological appeal but runs the 
risk of oversimplification. Economic geography models could in principle imply relatively 
higher subsidies at the locus of an industrial cluster because industry productivity is higher 
there: if workers are more productive in agglomerations, firms will require larger subsidies to 
pay their marginal product.24 Hence, a government’s objective function, unlike our simple 
model in equation (1), might include not only the number of jobs but also their productivity, 
giving the policy maker an incentive to favour employment at industry agglomerations.25 We 
therefore consider two additional features of policy capture models that do not feature in 
economic geography models. 
The first feature is that the jurisdictional level of government matters. Political 
economy models imply that lobbying may be more successful at a local rather than at a 
national level, as voters may be less well informed by the media about the actions of local 
governments than about those of the national government (due, for instance, to less intensive 
competition among media organisations at the local level); and interests may be easier to 
organise locally (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan, 2002). Local-level lobbying may 
also be easier due to a “preference dilution effect” at the national level, where firm-level 
preferences are more heterogeneous than at the local level (de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik, 
1993; Redoano, 2010). 
 Prediction 4 (policy capture): Firms located close to their industry’s geographical 
core attract more generous subsidies from regional government than from national 
government. 
The second feature we explore is that incumbent firms in mature or declining 
industries might lobby harder in the face of negative shocks, and that lobbying in such 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Graham and Melo (2010) for evidence on productivity in 
agglomerations. In estimation we control for average wages by industry-area-year, but this might conceivably 
not soak up all the relevant variation. 
25 A related setting is the “million dollar plant” scenario considered in Moretti (2010) and Greenstone, 
Hornbeck and Moretti (2010), where the main direction of agglomeration externalities is not from the 
surrounding industry to a given firm but from a particular (large) firm to the surrounding industry. For reasons 
set out in our concluding discussion we consider this not to be a plausible configuration given the scale of 
applications in our main empirical results. Moreover, the “million dollar plant” scenario resembles standard 
geography models in so far as it does not imply governments offering more generous subsidies to existing firms 
(as opposed to entrants), or to firms in declining (as opposed to growing) industries in their region. Hence, our 
Predictions 4 and 5 below are inconsistent with this setting as well. 
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industries might persist over time (Brainard and Verdier, 1997). Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 
(2007) show how the presence of sunk costs in declining industries implies that the payoff to 
lobbying may be higher than in growing industries, since the resulting rents are less likely to 
attract new entry. This behaviour on the part of incumbents would then explain the 
observation that ‘losers’ appear to be afforded greater protection by government. To examine 
this we look at whether incumbents seeking subsidies to protect existing employment are 
offered more favourable terms than plants only offering to create new jobs, and whether this 
is more prevalent in declining industries. 
Prediction 5 (policy capture): Firms attract higher subsidies per job the greater 
their focus on maintaining existing jobs, and the lower the local growth rate of their industry. 
In summary, Predictions 3 to 5 set out the hypotheses we use to evaluate the 
alternative model of policy capture. To take these predictions to the data, we exploit two 
features of the policy – whether the grant application is dealt with by a national or a regional 
authority, and whether the grant is to protect existing jobs or to create new ones. Moreover, 
we consider characteristics of the industry and location in which the application is made – 
whether the area is relatively specialized in that industry, and whether or not it is in relative 
decline. 
3.3 Selection and magnitudes 
One issue that may affect our empirical estimates is that firms self-select into 
applying for grants. Our setting therefore does not conform to the ideal of random 
assignment. However, there are reasons to expect selection bias not to be a significant issue 
in our data. First, selection into application may be on the basis of observable characteristics. 
If present, this source of selection would deprive us of some potentially informative 
observations (firms who anticipate insufficiently generous subsidies), but apart from affecting 
the precision of our estimates, it is hard to conceive of a mechanism through which this 
would bias the estimated coefficients, given the monotonic relationships implied by the 
theory. In Appendix A2, section 1, we analyse selection into application on the basis of our 
main variables of interest, by creating a pool of potential applicant plants. While we find 
some evidence that plants more remote from industry employment are less likely to apply, we 
do not find that this varies with the degree of industry agglomeration.   
Second, selection into application may be on the basis of unobservable characteristics, 
which could in principle bias our main coefficients of interest. For instance, the firms which 
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derive the highest localisation benefits might expect the available subsidies a priori to be 
insufficient to tempt them to apply for a grant in a remote Assisted Area. Alternatively, well-
informed firms (e.g. incumbents with connections to local awarding authorities) may be more 
likely, other things equal, to apply. However, since our primary tests are based on the sign of 
the coefficients, rather than on their precise magnitude, there is no reason to expect any 
under- or over-sampling as a result of selection to reverse the sign of our observed (and 
statistically significant) partial correlations.26 Take, for example, Predictions 2 and 3. If 
Prediction 2 had more explanatory power, firms considering investments far from their 
industry’s cluster would be more likely to apply, and if Prediction 3 were of greater empirical 
relevance, those firms would be less likely to apply. Among the firms that do apply because 
their expected subsidy exceeds the break-even point, the theory will still predict that in a 
world characterised by Prediction 2, those applying further away from their industry’s core 
will attract higher subsidies, and the reverse will obtain in a world characterised by Prediction 
3.27 Selection bias may reduce the precision and magnitude of our estimated effects, but it is 
unlikely that a selection mechanism will reverse the qualitative relationships we are interested 
in. 
Applicants in locations in England may also potentially select into applying to a 
regional policy authority rather than to the English national policy authority by choosing to 
apply for a subsidy below the threshold at which decision making passes to the national 
authority (£1 million pre-, and £2 million post-1996). In Appendix A2, section 2, we analyse 
applications on either side of the relevant threshold to see if there are systematic differences 
across that boundary in terms of our main variables of interest. For applications within 
£500,000 of the threshold we find no evidence that this is the case. 
Finally, by conditioning our main offer regressions on application amounts, we 
eliminate potential selection biases at the offer stage. Offers being made to practically all 
applicants, there is no selection issue at that stage of the procedure.28 
  
                                                 
26 Our focus on qualitative effects also allows us to abstract from the precise nature of agglomeration 
economies. Whether firms benefit from localised knowledge spillovers, from the local pooling of specialised 
labour or from sharing locally available intermediate inputs, the qualitative mechanism associated with 
geography models and relevant to Predictions 1 and 2 is the same: firms’ unit costs are lower, ceteris paribus, 
the closer they locate to the geographical core of their industry and the stronger is the agglomeration force, 
irrespective of its nature. 
27 As noted above, the estimated coefficients can of course reflect a combination of the two opposing effects. 
28 In addition, nearly all offers are accepted; further detail is provided in Appendix A3. 
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4 Results 
In this section, we begin by examining whether firms themselves internalise industry 
agglomeration economies when applying for a grant, and how this is reflected in government 
offers. We then estimate a further set of specifications for government offers, in order to 
explore predictions derived from the policy capture hypothesis. We carry out our main 
estimations on the sample of applications to the English regional authorities, and make 
comparisons to the set of applications to the national government authorities to further 
discriminate between the predictions of the economic geography versus policy capture 
models. 
4.1 Grant applications and offers 
We first investigate the relationship between both the amount applied for and the 
amount offered and the degree of industry localisation. Our estimating equation takes the 
general form of equation (4) above, but rather than using the per-job subsidy requested by, or 
offered to, the firm, we allow for some flexibility by replacing the dependent variable with 
the total amount applied for, 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡, or offered 𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡, and controlling for the number of jobs to 
be created or safeguarded as specified at each stage among the set of firm characteristics 𝑾𝒊𝒕 
on the right hand side.  
We estimate specifications for the grant application and grant offer jointly using a 
two-equation seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, which allows for correlation 
between the two error terms. The two estimation equations take the following form:  
𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 + 𝑿𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟐 + 𝒀𝒓𝒕𝜷𝟑 + 𝒁𝒓𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟒 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐽𝑗 + 𝑃𝑝 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡,    (5) 
and 
𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟓 + 𝑿𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟔 + 𝒀𝒓𝒕𝜷𝟕 + 𝒁𝒓𝒔𝒕𝜷𝟖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐽𝑗 + 𝑃𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡.   (6) 
The results are shown in Table 2, where specifications (2) and (4) include dummy 
variables for the different regional policy authorities within England, akin to including broad 
regional dummies. The estimated coefficients on the control variables are largely as expected. 
For instance, per-job application values and offers are higher in the most deprived (Tier 1) 
Assisted Areas and more generally are increasing in the maximum admissible grant rate. 
Grants requested and received by foreign multinationals, and by plants that are part of larger 
firms are also higher. Applications and subsequent offers which specify that they will only 
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safeguard jobs tend to be higher-value, and those which only create jobs are lower-value 
compared to applications that involve both. However, a greater amount is on average applied 
for, and offered per additional job created (around £2,000 offered per job) compared to an 
additional job safeguarded (around £1,000).  
We now turn to our main variables of interest. In specifications (1) and (2), the 
estimated coefficient on the EG index, shown in the top panel of the table, is positive but 
statistically insignificant. We therefore do not find strong support for Prediction 1, whereby 
in economic geography models firms in industries that are more highly localised would apply 
for and be offered higher per-job subsidies. 29  
We also explore the second element of Prediction 1 that subsidies per firm should be 
decreasing in the degree of industry localisation. In Table A2 in the Appendix, we use data at 
the 5-digit industry-year level to estimate how the value of offers at the industry level varies 
with the EG index, controlling for other potentially confounding industry-level characteristics 
as in the previous tables. Once we condition on either the total number of plants or firms in 
each industry-year, so that the results are informative about the generosity of subsidy offers 
to the average firm or plant in that sector, the coefficient on the EG index becomes 
insignificant, hence again not supporting Prediction 1 whereby more agglomerated industries 
should receive smaller funding per firm but greater funding per job. The estimated 
coefficients do however remain negative throughout, suggesting that the economic geography 
mechanism may to some extent be at play.30 
In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2 we include our measure of industry 
peripherality and the interaction term between this measure and the EG index. The coefficient 
on the interaction term allows us to distinguish between Predictions 2 and 3. In both 
specifications the coefficients on the interaction term in the application and offer equations 
are negative, and they are statistically significant in the offer equations. The tests at the foot 
of the table also show that the coefficients on the interaction terms in the application and 
offer equations are not significantly different from each other. In turn the coefficients on the 
                                                 
29 Appendix Table A1 checks the robustness of Prediction 1. Because the distribution of the EG index is 
skewed, with a small number of highly agglomerated industries, we replace the continuous measure with 
dummy variables indicating different percentiles of the EG index distribution (top 10%, 25% and 50%). The 
results are comparable to specification (2) in Table 2. We find only limited support for Prediction 1. In 
specification (3) in Table A1 we find that applicants in the top 50% of localised industries apply for and are 
offered higher subsidies per job. However, this specification is not very discriminating between agglomerated 
and non-agglomerated industries. 
30 The coefficient in column 3 of Table A2, implies that an increase in agglomeration of one standard-deviation 
is associated with a decrease in the offer per firm of £15,155 or 13.5% of the average offer (see Table 1). 
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EG index never indicate a statistically significant positive relationship as would be suggested 
by Predictions 1 and 2. If anything, the evidence points towards a negative relationship 
between an increase in the EG index and the amount offered per job.  
These findings imply that once we allow the application and offer per job to vary with 
both the degree of industry localisation and distance from industry employment, plants in 
more agglomerated industries apply for, and are offered, higher subsidies in locations that are 
closer to the mass of existing industry employment. This lends strong support to Prediction 3 
over Prediction 2. Between the two opposing predictions of the two theoretical settings, 
therefore, the data support the capture model as being dominant.31 
  
 
 
                                                 
31 Appendix Table A3 reports robustness checks on the results in Table 2. The first two specifications use 
alternative measures of industry peripherality. In (1) we measure industry peripherality as the percentage of 
industry employment in TTWAs located outside a 50km radius from the centre of the TTWA in which the 
application is made, and in (2) as the percentage of industry employment outside the TTWA in which the 
application is made. In all remaining specifications industry peripherality is defined as in Table 2. In (3) we also 
include a proxy for urbanisation: standardised total manufacturing employment in TTWAs located within a 
25km radius from the centre of the TTWA in which the application is made. In (4) we include TTWA dummies 
rather than policy authority dummies. In (5) we exclude the 2-digit industry dummies, and in (6) we drop the set 
of Enterprise Grants. In all six specifications the main conclusions from Table 2 remain unaltered. We discuss 
the results shown in (7) and (8) in Section 4.2. We also ascertained robustness to using a 5-year window for 
matching grant applications to the plant population data (see Appendix A1 for more detail on data matching). 
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Table 2. Applications and offers: seemingly unrelated regressions  
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Application Offer Application Offer  Application Offer Application Offer  
 EG Indexst-1 1.450 1.715 1.422 1.775 -1.535 -3.241 -1.999 -3.612 
(2.224) (1.741) (2.228) (1.742) (3.198) (2.500) (3.204) (2.504) 
 Industry peripheralitysrt-1     -0.897 0.333 -1.814 -0.451 
    (2.682) (2.097) (2.967) (2.319) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG indexst-1     -0.734 -1.444 -0.752 -1.474 
    (0.698) (0.546)*** (0.703) (0.550)*** 
Application / Offer characteristics         
Dummy job creation onlyi -2.584 -3.262 -2.431 -3.501 -2.561 -3.350 -2.434 -3.612 
 (3.735) (3.398) (3.752) (3.403) (3.735) (3.395) (3.751) (3.400) 
Dummy jobs safeguarded onlyi 8.135 3.476 9.322 4.039 7.980 3.417 9.121 3.932 
 (8.846) (6.794) (8.875) (6.803) (8.845) (6.790) (8.873) (6.798) 
Estimated new jobs at applicationi / offeri 2.052 2.062 2.051 2.053 2.052 2.062 2.050 2.053 
 (0.075)*** (0.066)*** (0.075)*** (0.067)*** (0.075)*** (0.066)*** (0.075)*** (0.066)*** 
Estimated safeguarded jobs at applicationi / 
offeri 
0.975 1.148 0.978 1.147 0.972 1.139 0.974 1.137 
(0.054)*** (0.048)*** (0.054)*** (0.048)*** (0.054)*** (0.048)*** (0.054)*** (0.048)*** 
Capital costs £1000i 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.054 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Firm  characteristics         
Dummy Multi-plant firmi 28.347 15.675 28.614 16.040 28.411 15.919 28.574 16.229 
 (4.971)*** (3.892)*** (4.976)*** (3.894)*** (4.976)*** (3.894)*** (4.986)*** (3.899)*** 
Total firm employmenti 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Foreign-owned MNEi 78.955 50.278 77.539 49.266 79.368 50.998 77.962 49.984 
 (10.677)*** (8.369)*** (10.686)*** (8.373)*** (10.681)*** (8.369)*** (10.689)*** (8.371)*** 
Entranti -5.635 -6.036 -6.028 -6.402 -5.545 -5.910 -5.901 -6.256 
 (4.374) (3.422)* (4.374) (3.421)* (4.374) (3.421)* (4.375) (3.420)* 
Plant employment growthi -0.892 -0.696 -0.921 -0.726 -0.896 -0.709 -0.927 -0.740 
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 (0.725) (0.567) (0.724) (0.567) (0.725) (0.567) (0.724) (0.567) 
Industry characteristics         
Investment per worker st-1s 2.475 0.676 2.510 0.723 2.514 0.725 2.559 0.781 
 (0.860)*** (0.673) (0.859)*** (0.673) (0.861)*** (0.673) (0.861)*** (0.673) 
Skilled/unskilled worker wage bill ratio st-1s 12.956 24.493 17.415 29.794 12.946 25.423 17.614 30.882 
 (31.387) (24.551) (31.480) (24.616) (31.416) (24.562) (31.493) (24.613) 
Mean plant age st-1 0.174 0.531 0.162 0.531 0.185 0.614 0.153 0.596 
 (1.211) (0.947) (1.211) (0.947) (1.215) (0.950) (1.215) (0.949) 
Mean employment growth st-1 4.477 1.793 4.473 1.857 4.602 2.018 4.643 2.114 
 (5.709) (4.466) (5.705) (4.461) (5.709) (4.464) (5.705) (4.459) 
Area characteristics         
Dummy Tier 1 Assisted Areart 39.822 29.084 37.493 26.727 40.216 29.275 37.650 26.791 
 (6.323)*** (4.942)*** (6.856)*** (5.359)*** (6.363)*** (4.972)*** (6.859)*** (5.359)*** 
Maximum grant ratert 129.488 110.463 134.506 116.654 127.898 109.212 133.549 115.804 
 (42.093)*** (32.913)*** (43.026)*** (33.636)*** (42.150)*** (32.944)*** (43.031)*** (33.623)*** 
Real industry wagesrt-1 -0.014 0.701 -0.101 0.610 0.003 0.727 -0.099 0.624 
 (0.580) (0.454) (0.587) (0.459) (0.580) (0.454) (0.587) (0.459) 
Claimant count ratert-1 -12.617 -12.647 -14.773 -9.562 -12.605 -12.653 -14.842 -9.793 
 (3.577)*** (2.792)*** (8.917)* (6.974) (3.577)*** (2.790)*** (8.918)* (6.970) 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 
Test statistics         
Equality of EG Index st-1 coefficients chi2(1) = 0.03 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.865 
chi2(1) = 0.05 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.821 
chi2(1) = 0.58 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.447 
chi2( 1) =    0.51 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
Equality of Industry peripheralitysrt-1 
coefficients 
  chi2(1) =  0.43 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.513 
chi2( 1) =    0.43 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
Equality of Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG indexst-1 coefficients 
  chi2(1) = 2.11 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.147 
chi2( 1) =    2.14 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
Note: ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample: 4,264 applications to English regional policy authorities. Variables are defined in 
Section 2.2. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS).  
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As a second exercise to explore the discriminatory Predictions 2 and 3, we estimate an 
alternative specification of the offer equation. In Table 3, the dependent variable remains the 
amount offered, but we now directly condition on the amount applied for. To the extent that 
there exist unobservables which affect both the application and offer amounts in the same 
way, these will be controlled for when we condition on the application amount. This control 
variable evidently is not fully exogenous, and hence the estimates reported in Table 3 do not 
have a clean causal interpretation. We nonetheless consider this a useful parsimonious 
complement to our SUR estimations. 
Table 3. Offer, conditional on application amount: variation by policy authority 
Dependent variable: 
offer amount £1000s 
English Regions  National Governments  All Authorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Application amount 
£1000s 
0.615 0.614 0.712 0.725 0.715 0.725 
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.036)*** (0.038)*** 
EG indexst-1 -1.615 -1.744 1.222 3.096 -2.155 -2.030 
(0.895)* (0.896)* (4.034) (4.109) (1.774) (1.674) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 1.442 1.429 2.765 -7.182 3.490 0.248 
(1.164) (1.533) (10.947) (8.228) (1.850)* (2.323) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG indexst-1 
-0.938 -0.981 1.487 3.003 -0.712 -0.398 
(0.375)** (0.378)*** (1.543) (1.299)** (0.360)** (0.424) 
       
Offer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,264 4,264 1,690 1,690 5,954 5,954 
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.86 
Note: Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the 5-digit industry and TTWA level in parentheses. ***, **, * 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Estimation sample: 4,264 applications to English regional policy authorities, columns 
(1) and (2), to the English national authority and to Wales and Scotland, columns (3) and (4), and to the full sample, columns 
(5) and (6). All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Offer, Firm, Industry and Area characteristics as in Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS).  
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 for our sample of applications to English 
regional authorities imply that conditional on other characteristics the amount offered 
corresponds to some 61 percent of that applied for. The coefficients on the interaction of the 
EG index with the industry peripherality measure are in line with the results in Table 2. In 
both columns, with and without the policy authority dummies, we find results that directly 
contradict Prediction 2: firms in fact receive higher offers, conditional on the amount they 
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applied for, in areas that are closer to industry employment. The results in column (2) 
indicate that at the mean value of industry peripherality, an increase in the EG index of one 
standard deviation would result in a decrease in the offer per job of £1,744, or around 40% of 
the average per-job offer. Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of a one standard deviation 
increase in the EG index across the entire distribution of the industry peripherality measure 
(the figure uses the standardised measure, with the most negative values on the x-axis 
indicating a relatively small number of areas closest to industry employment). The 
relationship is clearly negative, and statistically significant in areas with very low or very 
high shares of industry employment – the opposite of Prediction 2.32 
Figure 1: Effect of a one standard deviation change in EG index on the offer per job 
across the distribution of industry peripherality 
 
Note: Derived from the results in column (2) of Table 3, using standardised measures of the EG index and 
industry peripherality (mean zero, standard deviation 1). dOffer/dEG Index shows the change in the offer per 
job (in £1000s) of a one standard deviation (one unit) increase in the EG index. Dashed lines show 95% 
confidence intervals.  
Source: authors calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (Source BIS). 
 
In sum, of the two contradictory Predictions 2 and 3, it is Prediction 3 that is 
supported by the data for the set of applications to the English regional authorities, consistent 
with policy capture rather than the economic geography mechanism. Hence, while both may 
                                                 
32 We obtain the same pattern of results with negative and statistically significant coefficients on the EG index 
and on the interaction term if we estimate with the application amount, offer amount and capital costs variables 
expressed in logs. 
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still play a role, policy capture seems to be the dominant force at the sub-national level. We 
investigate this further below, by examining whether the data support the two complementary 
hypotheses, Predictions 4 and 5, with regard to policy capture. 
4.2 Policy capture 
We start by examining Prediction 4, which implies that local policy authorities will be 
more susceptible than national governments to policy capture by locally active firms. We 
contrast our sample of applications to the English regional authorities with the sample of 
applications dealt with by the national agencies (England, Wales, Scotland), and with the full 
sample. Columns (3) to (6) of Table 3 repeat the specifications in the first two columns. 
Comparison of the sample of applications to the English region to the sample of applications 
to the national authorities reveals that, conditional on other characteristics, on average 
applicants to the English regions are offered a lower fraction of the value of their application 
(61 percent versus 72 percent at the national level).  
Most importantly, we find that the negative coefficient on the interaction of central 
interest, found previously in columns (1) and (2), is confined to applications made to the 
English regions, whereas a positive, and in the presence of the policy authority dummies 
statistically significant, effect is observed for applications administered at the national level 
(columns (3) and (4)).33 Hence, for applications to the national policy authorities, although 
again both mechanisms may be at work, the pattern of offers appears to be more in line with 
that suggested by economic geography models. 
When we pool the data, in columns (5) and (6), the negative interaction effects again 
dominate. That this pattern is driven by applications to the regional authorities is supported 
by a comparison of these final two columns, where the negative coefficient on the interaction 
term becomes less negative and loses statistical significance once we control for the policy 
authority dummies. Our results are therefore consistent with Prediction 4, whereby it is 
lower-tier governments that are more generous to firms in agglomerated sectors, and in 
particular when the industry in which the firm operates is more spatially concentrated in the 
location in which the application is made.  
                                                 
33 The inclusion of the policy authority dummies for Wales and Scotland (peripheral regions) versus the English 
national government (which only administers very high value applications) leads to substantial changes in the 
coefficients on EG Index and the interaction term between EG and the industry peripherality measure.  
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As further checks, the final two specifications in Table A3 in the Appendix estimate 
the seemingly unrelated regression specifications (equations (5) and (6)) for the sample of 
applications to the national policy authorities and for a separate sample of applications by 
foreign-owned firms only. These are both more supportive of the economic geography 
hypothesis, suggesting – in line with the theory – that capture is less of an issue at higher 
levels of government and for non-national firms. 
Next, we explore Prediction 5, which implies that incumbent firms (as opposed to 
new entrants) and firms in declining industries will attract higher per-job subsidies. In Table 
4 we return to our main sample of applications made to the English regions and split it into 
applications that only involve the creation of new jobs and those that offer to safeguard 
existing jobs at an established site, where the latter group will be incumbent firms, and since 
they are applying to safeguard existing jobs more likely to be in decline.  
We replicate the specification from column (2) of Table 3. In column (1) of Table 4, 
we consider applications that only involve job creation. This group can include entrants and 
since they are not applying to safeguard jobs we assume that they are less likely to be in 
decline. In column (2) we consider those that involve only job creation (as in column (1)) or a 
combination of job creation and job safeguarding. In column (3) we consider a set of 
incumbent firms: applications that involve only job safeguarding or a combination of job 
creation and job safeguarding (there are too few applications that only safeguard jobs to 
consider these alone). From the policy rules, the jobs being supported by the subsidy must be 
‘marginal’, in the sense that in the absence of the public subsidy and new investment they 
would be lost; hence the firms in the estimation sample in column (3) can be considered as in 
decline.  
We find negative and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction terms 
between industry peripherality and the EG index in columns (2) and (3), with a stronger 
relationship in column (3) for those grant applications that include some component of job 
safeguarding. These results support Prediction 5: declining incumbent firms in more 
agglomerated areas are more successful at attracting subsidies than firms that are exclusively 
creating new jobs, a set which encompasses new entrants. 
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Table 4. Offer, conditional on application amount: applications to create versus 
safeguard jobs 
Dependent variable: offer 
amount £1000s 
Application type 
 Job creation only 
 
 
(1) 
Job creation only + 
Job creation and 
safeguarding 
(2) 
Job safeguarding only 
+ Job creation and 
safeguarding 
(3) 
Application amount £1000s 0.630 0.592 0.615 
(0.054)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)*** 
EG Indexst-1 -1.003 -1.659 -1.592 
(1.694) (0.940)* (2.147) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 -0.152 0.398 5.225 
(0.868) (1.601) (3.418) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG indexst-1 
-0.023 -0.448 -2.448 
(0.239) (0.212)** (1.050)** 
    
Offer characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,685 4,047 1,579 
R-squared 0.91 0.89 0.90 
Note: Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the 5-digit industry and TTWA level in parentheses. ***, **, * 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Estimation samples: sub-sets of applications to English regional policy authorities, as 
defined by the column headings. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Offer, Firm, Industry and Area 
characteristics as in Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
In Table 5, we cut the sample of applications to English regions according to a 
measure of average plant employment growth in the industry-TTWA in the year prior to the 
application being made. The first two columns replicate the specification of column (2) in 
Table 3 for applications in industry-areas with below median employment growth and the 
final two columns for applications in industry-areas with above median employment growth. 
In each case, we estimate the model separately for all applications and the subset which 
include an element of job-safeguarding. The results suggest that the more generous behaviour 
on the part of the policy authorities to applicants in more locally agglomerated industries is 
confined to cases where industry-area employment is in relative decline and is again stronger 
in the case of applications that propose to safeguard existing jobs. Hence these findings 
provide further support for Prediction 5 and thus the policy capture mechanism. 
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Table 5. Offer, conditional on application amount: low versus high industry-area 
employment growth 
Dependent variable: offer 
amount £1000s 
Bottom 50% by industry-area 
employment growth 
Top 50% by industry-area 
employment growth 
 All 
 
(1) 
Some job 
safeguarding 
(2) 
All 
 
(3) 
Some job 
safeguarding 
(4) 
Application amount £1000s 0.596 0.572 0.608 0.611 
(0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.045)*** (0.054)*** 
EG Indexst-1 -1.399 -0.871 -1.629 -0.872 
(1.975) (5.258) (1.146) (1.936) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 3.901 9.389 -1.288 -0.702 
(2.373) (4.776)** (1.373) (2.708) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG 
indexst-1 
-1.386 -3.447 0.129 -0.013 
(0.412)*** (1.330)*** (0.342) (0.676) 
Offer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,132 801 2,132 778 
R-squared 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 
Note: Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the 5-digit industry and TTWA level in parentheses. ***, **, * 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Estimation samples: applications to English regional policy authorities, split according 
to column headings. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Offer, Firm, Industry and Area characteristics as in 
Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS) 
 
As a final robustness check on Predictions 3 to 5, we split the sample of applications 
to the English regions according to a measure of the extent to which the TTWA in which the 
application is made is specialised in the respective industry, measured in year t-1.34 We again 
consider separately grant applications that involve some job safeguarding and must therefore 
be made by incumbent plants in decline. The results, shown in Table 6, suggest that the more 
generous behaviour on the part of the policy authorities is confined to cases where the area is 
relatively specialised in the industry and is stronger in the case of applications that are to 
safeguard existing jobs. Figure 2 shows clearly that for highly specialised industry-areas, 
columns (1) and (2), the marginal effect on the offer per-job of a change in the EG index is 
decreasing in industry peripherality, and positive and statistically significant at very low 
values, i.e. in areas with a high share of industry employment. In contrast, this is not the case 
for the results in columns (3) and (4), where the marginal effect is never statistically 
                                                 
34 We measure specialisation by: (employmentsrt / employmentrt)/ (employmentst / employmentt), where s, r and 
t are 5-digit industry, TTWA and year, respectively. 
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significantly different from zero across the whole distribution. Hence, these results further 
support Predictions 3 to 5 associated with models of policy capture. 
Table 6. Offer, conditional on application amount, English regions, industry specialised 
versus non-specialised areas 
Dependent variable: offer 
amount £1000s 
Top 50% by area-industry 
specialisation 
Bottom  50% by area-industry 
specialisation 
 All 
 
(1) 
Some job 
safeguarding 
(2) 
All 
 
(3) 
Some job 
safeguarding 
(4) 
Application amount £1000s 0.594 0.592 0.688 0.648 
(0.021)*** (0.025)*** (0.065)*** (0.073)*** 
EG Indexst-1 -2.361 -4.572 -0.352 2.377 
(1.551) (3.519) (0.948) (1.701) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 4.265 12.221 -2.180 -5.108 
(2.911) (7.109)* (0.809)*** (2.035)** 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG 
indexst-1 
-2.058 -5.518 0.045 0.479 
(0.606)*** (1.616)*** (0.094) (0.326) 
Offer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,144 879 2,120 700 
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the 5-digit industry and TTWA level in parentheses. ***, **, * 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Estimation samples: applications to English regional policy authorities, split according 
to column headings. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Offer, Firm, Industry and Area characteristics as in 
Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of a one unit change in EG index on the offer per-job: 
industry specialised versus non-specialised areas 
 
Note: Derived from the results in Table 6, using standardised measures of the EG index and industry peripherality 
(mean zero, standard deviation 1). dOffer/dEG index shows the change in the offer per job (in £1,000s) of a one 
standard deviation (one unit) increase in the EG index. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. 
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
 
Is the policy capture hypothesis, supported as it is by our estimation results, plausible 
in the context of British policy institutions? Independent assessment of the application 
process and receipt of RSA grants has pointed out that subsidies were being awarded 
repeatedly to the same incumbent firms. The National Audit Office (2003), and independent 
body which evaluates public spending within England, described the RSA policy as 
“demand-led”, with the scheme being publicised to firms via brochures, and websites.35 
However, they expressed concern about the tendency for some firms to receive multiple 
grants over time, stating that “between April 1994 and March 2002, of all companies 
accepting grant offers, 12 percent had received more than one grant, amounting to 31 percent 
of the total value of offers accepted.” (National Audit Office, 2003, p. 21), and suggested that 
                                                 
35 The programme was not actively marketed to firms in specific targeted sectors or geographic areas, as EU 
rules stipulated that such policies must be available equally across eligible sectors. 
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applying for a grant may become a “business skill” potentially biasing the system in favour of 
previously successful applicants. To corroborate this for our data, we present an analysis of 
repeat applications to the English regional policy authorities in Appendix A2, section 3. In 
line with our conclusions the results are indeed suggestive that plants in more agglomerated 
industries that are closer to industry employment are more likely to be owned by firms that 
make multiple applications.36 
5. Conclusions 
We exploit plant-level administrative data on a regional investment subsidy 
programme in Great Britain to study policy responses to the presence of localisation 
economies, pitting the predictions of economic geography models against those of models of 
policy capture. At the sub-national level, we find that, conditional on the amount applied for 
by firms, governments offer more generous subsidies to firms in more agglomerated 
industries in areas with a higher density of industry employment. This phenomenon is most 
pronounced for applications aimed at safeguarding existing jobs, and for applications in areas 
where employment in the respective industry is in relative decline. Taken together, these 
results are in line with theories of policy capture by incumbent local industries, and they run 
against the “taxable agglomeration rents” result of economic geography models. This implies 
that policy capture has greater explanatory power for the structure of sub-national 
government grant awards, even though the forces identified in economic geography models 
may also be at play. Indeed, we find that for grant awards decided by national policy 
authorities the pattern of applications and offers conforms to a greater extent with the 
qualitative predictions of economic geography models. 
On the face of it, our finding that subsidies offered by lower-tier authorities are more 
generous in areas that host the industry’s agglomeration is consistent with another 
explanation: local jurisdictions could be using subsidies to attract plants that might 
themselves generate significant agglomeration externalities for the area, and such external 
benefits could be more pronounced in locations that are already relatively specialised in an 
applicant’s industry (Greenstone et al., 2010; Moretti, 2010). However, we consider this an 
                                                 
36 Criscuolo et al. (2012) also discuss the possibility of “gaming” within the RSA scheme, by larger (higher 
employment), multi-plant firms, suggesting that the lack of evidence for additionality among these firms might 
be due to their ability to re-locate employment across plants. Their findings are consistent with ours since many 
larger, multi-plant employers do make applications to the English regional policy authorities. Table 1 indicates 
that 30% of applicants to the English regional authorities are multi-plant firms; the corresponding figure for our 
national policy authority sample is 41%. 
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improbable explanation for the pattern of grant offers we observe. First, agglomeration 
benefits running from applicant plants to firms in the surrounding area (rather than the other 
way around) are likely to be an issue only for relatively large projects. This plausibly holds in 
the case of the “million dollar plants” studied by Greenstone et al., (2010), but not in our 
policy setting, where the projects at stake are some two orders of magnitude smaller.37 
Second, we find that these more generous offers are made to incumbent plants applying to 
safeguard existing jobs but not to entrants creating new jobs. This asymmetric treatment by 
policy authorities cannot be readily explained by a model with agglomeration effects.  
Our results are reminiscent of prior findings whereby subsidy policies ostensibly 
targeted at growth sectors in fact are geared heavily towards industries and regions in relative 
decline (Beason and Weinstein, 2005; Martin, Mayer and Mayneris, 2011), and they support 
the view that the optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation is contingent on the extent to which 
policy may be subject to capture by dominant entrenched local interests (Bardhan, 2002). The 
normative relevance of such policy capture has been emphasized, among others, by Glaeser 
(2002, p.28), for whom, among the conceivable reasons why local jurisdictions offer fiscal 
inducements to mobile firms, the “corruption and influence story” is “the only theory that 
suggests that tax incentives would create spatial distortions”. To our knowledge, however, no 
formal model exists that combines firm-level agglomeration economies with lobbying and 
fiscal federalism. This could offer a fruitful opening for future research.  
                                                 
37 The average plant in Greenstone et al. (2010, p. 555) accounted for close to three million labour hours, which 
translates into some 1,600 full-time jobs, whereas in our sample the average grant offer was associated with an 
estimated 16 new or 10 safeguarded jobs (see Table 1). 
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Appendix A1: Matching the grants data to the ARD 
 
We use information provided by the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
to link the RSA and Enterprise Grant applicants to the ARD data. BIS have matched the 
grants data to the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) which is the population 
underlying the ARD using information including postcodes and company names. We restrict 
our analysis to applications in the manufacturing sector between 1985 and 2004 and also to 
applications which received an offer, reported a positive number of jobs to be created or 
safeguarded in the data and were not withdrawn, of which there are 21,270 applications. In 
addition, we have a further 4,438 applications for which the industry code information is 
missing in the application information which we try to match. We therefore begin with 
25,708 applications.  
Matching information is provided for 20,876 (or 82%). However, the grants data can be 
matched into the ARD data at various levels of aggregation; for example directly to single 
site plants, to establishments (that in principle can comprise more than one plant under 
common ownership at different locations), or at the firm level, which means that the grant 
application is matched to all plants within the firm (which can total over 100 sites). In some 
cases, applications are also matched to multiple plants or establishments, i.e. are not unique. 
Because the precise location of the site associated with the application is a crucial factor in 
our analysis, we restrict our estimation sample to applicants where the match is at the plant or 
establishment level. This leaves a set of 12,887 potential grant applications over the period 
1985 to 2004 to be matched. We are able to match 9,379 (73%) into unique plants or 
establishments in the manufacturing sector in ARD data between 1984 and 2006. (For those 
applications where we knew that the application was to the manufacturing sector the match 
rate is higher at 81%) 
Matches at the establishment level may still entail matching to multiple plants at more than 
one site, but they will be operating in the same industry. To attribute a location, we both 
ensure that the location we attribute to the grant application is within an Assisted Area, and 
select the modal Travel to Work Area, and the modal value of other characteristics across the 
plants within an establishment. 
We then restrict our analysis to matches within three years of the application date leaving 
6,185 applications. We are unable to use the 1984 matches in our estimates, as lagged values 
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of our location specific variables are unavailable. Once missing data, for example on jobs 
associated with the application are accounted for, and the top and bottom percent of 
observations by grant value are eliminated (due to implausible outlier values), our final 
sample comprises 5,954 applications. Of these 4,264 are applications to English regional 
policy authorities. 
We ran probit models to check that there were no systematic relationships between the 
probability of matching a grant and the value of the EG index for the respective industry, and 
also the application amount per job. The results of these exercises are reported in the Table 
below. We find little evidence that the probability of a match is related in a systematic way to 
the agglomeration intensity of the industry or the application amount per job. We ascertain 
that this is the case both for the full sample of grants to any policy authority and the subset 
applying to English regional policy authorities. For applications to the English regional 
authorities, because we need to know the location of the plant for which the application is 
made, we can only consider those applications from the population that in principle are 
matched at the plant or establishment level, and for which the postcode information supplied 
can be meaningfully matched to a region of England.  
Matched applications 
Dep var =1 if grant 
application is in 
estimation sample 
All applications Applications to English regional 
authorities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EG indexst-1 -0.008 0.0001 -0.006 0.005 
 (-2.65)*** (0.02) (-1.16) (0.82) 
Application year 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
Observations 21,848 21,848 8,282 8,282 
Dep var =1 if grant 
application is in 
estimation sample 
All applications  Applications to English regional 
authorities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Application amount per 
jobit 
0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0015 
(0.20) (0.82) (0.58) (1.36) 
Application year 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
Observations 21,848 21,848 8,282 8,282 
Note: Tables show marginal effects from a probit model with z-statistics in brackets. Matched sample is before 
excluding the top and bottom percent of observations by grant value. For the all grants sample, the number of 
observations is fewer than 25,708 due to missing information on industry codes / EG index. For applications to 
the English regional authorities the number of observations represents the subset of the applications that are 
made to English regional policy authorities, based on application value and location.  ***, **, * significant at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Appendix A2: Grant applications 
 
1. Selection into application 
We consider whether the characteristics of those plants to which we match an application, 
differ systematically from the overall population of potential applicants. This latter 
population is not observed, since it would include new entrants, including new plants set up 
by firms outside Assisted Areas and foreign multinationals setting up new plants. We proxy 
the potential applicant pool using the set of existing plants in each year located in Assisted 
Areas.  
We examine whether there are differences in application rates across plants in more or less 
agglomerated industries, in locations more remote from industry employment and the 
interaction between these two variables. We estimate simple probit models where the 
dependent variable takes the value of one if plant i is ever matched to a grant application over 
the sample period. Although we observe a negative correlation between making an 
application and remoteness from industry employment, there is no evidence that this 
additionally varies by the degree to which the industry is agglomerated and little evidence 
that the degree to which the industry is agglomerated is related to the probability of making 
an application. 
Application 
Dep var =1 if plant ever 
makes an application 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
EG indexst-1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.02) (-0.92) (-0.54) (-1.35) (-1.32) (-1.07) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1    -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
    (-2.18)** (-3.93)*** (-2.42)** 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG 
indexst-1 
   0.0007 -0.00005 -0.00002 
   (1.38) (-0.24) (-0.17) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 443,407 443,407 443,407 443,407 443,407 443,407 
Note: Tables show marginal effects with z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit 
industry level. Year dummies are defined using the average year between 1985 and 2006 which the plant is 
observed in the sample. 10,160 plants are matched as ever making an application, as in this exercise we do not 
condition on positive offers and jobs associated with the offer, or whether or not the application was 
subsequently withdrawn.  ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
2. Application to the English regional versus English national authorities 
In the next table we examine selection into application to the English regional authorities 
versus the national policy authority for England. To do this we use a set of matched 
38  
 
 
applications whose value falls in a region around the threshold which determines whether or 
not the application is dealt with at the national level. Up until 1996 this was applications over 
£1 million, rising to £2 million in 1996. We use two samples, applications within £500,000 of 
the threshold and those within £750,000 of the threshold. The table below reports the results 
of running a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value one if the 
application is to the English regional authorities. We find little to no evidence of selection 
into applying to the lower-tier policy authorities according to our main variables of interest. 
Application to English regional versus English national authorities 
Dep var =1 if plant  
applies to regional 
authorities 
Within £500k of threshold Within £750k of threshold 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EG indexst-1 -0.006 0.021 -0.035 0.006 -0.003 0.00004   -0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.22) (0.59) (-0.69) (0.11) (-0.17) (-0.00) (-0.05) (-0.24) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1   -0.043 -0.030   -0.038 -0.038 
   (-1.22) (-0.73)   (-2.04)** (-1.86)* 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG indexst-1 
  0.022 0.039   0.008 0.009 
  (0.38) (0.54)   (0.57) (0.81) 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 174 143 174 143 301 253 301 253 
Note: Tables show marginal effects with z-statistics in brackets. Year dummies are defined using the application 
year.  ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
3. Repeat applicants to English regional authorities 
We identify applicant plants which belong to firms that make multiple applications to the 
English regional authorities during our estimation period. In the table below, in columns (1) 
to (4) we run a linear regression where the dependent variable is the count of applications 
made by the firm which owns each plant over the estimation sample period. In columns (5) to 
(8) we estimate probit models where the dependent variable is takes the value one when the 
plant is owned by a firm that makes multiple applications. In both cases we find evidence to 
suggest that plants in more agglomerated industries located in areas closer to industry 
employment are more likely to be owned by firms that make more than one application. 
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Multiple applications to the English regional authorities 
 Dep var = count of applications to regional 
authorities made by the firm which owns 
the plant  
Dep var =1 if plant owned by a firm that 
applies to regional authorities more than 
once 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EG indexst-1 0.006 0.002 0.028 0.024 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)** (0.013)* (-0.59) (-0.76) (0.69) (0.65) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1   0.003 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.011) (0.011)   (-0.11) (-0.15) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG indexst-1 
  -0.007 -0.007   -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.003)** (0.003)**   (-1.61) (-1.75)* 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,270 4,270 4,270 4,270 4,270 4,270 4,270 4,270 
Note: Table shows marginal effects with standard errors in brackets (columns 1 to 4) and z-statistics in brackets 
columns (5 to 7). Year dummies are defined using the application year.  ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level. 
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Appendix A3: Grant offer acceptance 
Using the population of applications, a very high proportion, around 88% receive an offer. Of 
those that receive an offer 92% accept. 
Our main sample contains a set of applications all of whom receive an offer, and which we 
can successfully match to the ARD. For our estimation sample, both the full sample and the 
sample of applications to English regional policy authorities, 95% of the offers are accepted 
(we would not observe greenfield entrants who did not accept, and chose never to enter). The 
tables below show marginal effects from a probit model relating the probability of acceptance 
to our main variables of interest, for the full sample and the sample of applications to the 
English regional authorities. 
 
Acceptance 
 
Dep var =1 if grant offer is 
accepted 
All grants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EG indexst-1 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (1.20) (0.79) (0.94) (0.56) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.002 
 (1.36) (2.20)* (2.17)** (0.46) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG indexst-1 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
 (1.57) (0.61) (0.59) (0.99) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Policy authority dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 5,954 5,954 5,946 5,946 
 
Dep var =1 if grant offer is 
accepted 
English Regions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EG indexst-1 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.89) (0.63) (0.81) (0.48) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.004 
 (1.02) (1.59) (1.90)* (0.81) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * EG indexst-1 0.002 0.001 0.0004 0.001 
 (1.38) (0.69) (0.52) (0.70) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Policy authority dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 4,264 4,264 4,257 4,257 
Note: Tables show marginal effects with z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the 5 digit 
industry level. Some observations are dropped from the sample in columns (3) and (4) due to lack of variation 
within 2-digit industries. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1. Dummy variables for percentiles of EG Index top 10%, 25%, 50%. SUR Application and Offer 
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) 
Application Offer Application Offer  Application Offer 
EG Top 10%tile 8.285 1.443     
(7.157) (5.598)     
EG Top 25%tile   5.450 0.272   
  (5.578) (4.363)   
EG Top 50%tile     8.111 9.035 
    (5.122) (4.004)** 
Application / Offer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 
Test statistics       
Equality of EG Index st-1 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    1.86 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1730 
chi2(  1) =    1.75 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.186 
chi2(  1) =    0.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.797 
Note: ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Offer, Firm, Industry and Area characteristics as in Table 2. Estimation 
sample: 4,264 applications to English regional policy authorities. 
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
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Table A2. Total value of offers – industry-level: applications to English regional authorities 
Dependent variable: value of offersst (1) (2) (3) 
EG Indexst-1 -25.454 -13.645 -15.155 
(10.261)** (9.936) (10.005) 
Total plantsst  0.063  
 (0.006)***  
Total firmsst    0.067 
  (0.006)*** 
Investment in plant and machinery per worker st-1s 5.407 8.438 8.333 
(2.259)** (2.256)*** (2.261)*** 
Skilled/unskilled worker wage bill ratiost-1 -65.273 20.972 19.944 
(63.352) (61.167) (61.067) 
Mean  plant agest-1 3.500 17.254 17.066 
(3.312) (3.425)*** (3.431)*** 
Mean employment growthst-1 -0.914 3.487 3.718 
(9.339) (8.979) (9.060) 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,131 2,131 2,131 
R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.12 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Estimation sample: 2,131 
observations at the 5-digit industry year level. 
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
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Table A3. Robustness checks and extensions 
 Industry peripherality 
(50km radius) 
(1) 
Industry peripherality 
(within TTWA) 
(2) 
Controlling for urbanisation 
 
(3) 
Including TTWA dummies 
 
(4) 
Application Offer Application Offer Application Offer Application Offer 
EG Indexst-1 -1.357 -3.298 -2.600 -4.366 -2.233 -3.747 -5.637 -5.357 
(3.126) (2.443) (3.117) (2.436)* (3.203) (2.504) (3.332)* (2.574)** 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 -2.040 -1.951 -6.758 -5.341 -4.977 -2.284 -5.606 -2.911 
(2.966) (2.319) (3.145) ** (2.458)** (3.232) (2.527) (3.246)* (2.508) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG Indexst-1 
-0.767 -1.617 -0.045 -0.595 -0.394 -1.267 -0.670 -1.294 
(0.841) (0.658)** (0.463) (0.362)* (0.717) (0.561)** (0.759) (0.587)** 
Urbanisation rt-1     -8.030 -4.655   
     (3.264)** (2.552)*   
Characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Observations 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,264 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.77 
Test statistics      
Equality of EG Index st-1 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    0.78 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.376 
chi2(  1) =    0.65 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.419 
chi2(  1) =    0.45 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.501 
chi2(  1) =    0.01 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.906 
Equality of industry 
peripherality measure 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    0.00 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.966 
chi2(  1) =    0.41 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.521 
chi2(  1) =    1.41 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.235 
chi2(  1) =    1.37 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.242 
 
Equality of interaction 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    2.07 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.150 
chi2(  1) =    2.86 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.091 
chi2(  1) =    3.00 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.083 
chi2(  1) =    1.34 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.247 
Equality of urbanisation 
coefficients 
  chi2(  1) =    2.17 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.141 
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Table A3. Robustness checks and extensions, continued 
 Omitting industry dummies 
 
(5) 
Excluding Enterprise Grants 
 
(6) 
Applicants to national policy 
authorities 
(7) 
Foreign only, applicants to all 
policy authorities 
(8) 
Application Offer Application Offer Application Offer Application Offer 
EG Indexst-1 -0.872 -3.174 -2.646 -4.194 6.421 6.619 65.105 34.498 
(3.039) (2.372) (3.321) (2.581) (12.643) (11.572) (32.180)** (31.483) 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 -1.391 0.253 -1.395 0.381 -65.821 -51.866 -67.215 -59.449 
(2.889) (2.255) (3.251) (2.527) (14.231)*** (13.085)*** (36.744)* (35.882)* 
Industry peripheralitysrt-1 * 
EG Indexst-1 
-0.745 -1.550 -1.142 -2.005 9.092 10.346 27.854 16.928 
(0.684) (0.534)*** (0.801) (0.623)*** (4.171)** (3.817)*** (13.421)** (13.095) 
Characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Application year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy authority  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,264 4,264 3,877 3,877 1,690 1,690 411 411 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.65 
Test statistics      
Equality of EG Index st-1 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    1.16 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.281 
chi2(  1) =    0.43 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.511 
chi2(  1) =    0.00 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.984 
chi2(  1) =    0.91 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.341 
Equality of industry 
peripherality measure 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    0.66 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.418 
chi2(  1) =    0.59 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.442 
chi2(  1) =    1.51 
         Prob > chi2 =  0.220 
chi2(  1) =    0.04 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.833 
 
Equality of interaction 
coefficients 
chi2(  1) =    2.80 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.094 
chi2(  1) =    2.30 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.129 
chi2(  1) =    0.14 
         Prob > chi2 =   0.705 
chi2(  1) =    0.67 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.414 
Note: ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions contain a constant. Characteristics controls: Application, Offer, Firm, Industry and Area as in Table 2, other than column 
(6), where capital costs are replaced by log capital costs. Urbanisation is defined as standardised total manufacturing employment in the set of TTWAs located within a 25km radius from the 
centre of the TTWA in which the application is made. Estimation sample columns (1)-(5) 4,264 applications to English regional authorities; columns (6) to (8) as defined in column headings. 
Source: authors’ calculations using ARD (Source ONS) and RSA, Enterprise Grant data (source BIS). 
 
